Congress seems poised to act. The full US House of Representatives has passed the measure twice. The first measure was included in the 2010 omnibus healthcare bill, but the settlements provision had to be stripped before final passage to match the Senate version (thus keeping the bill filibuster-proof). More recently, the measure was added to the House's war funding bill for Afghanistan, but dropped again. At the time of this writing, the US Senate Appropriations Committee has inserted the measure into its Fiscal Year 2011 spending bill. If the House follows suit, the bill could be passed shortly after Congress returns from its summer recess. As these stealthy tactics suggest, however, it is not clear whether the members of Congress understand what the bill provides. Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI), a primary sponsor, said that, "our bill will not ban any settlement which does not involve an exchange of money" (2), a statement the bill itself expressly contradicts.
But this much is clear: if enacted, this law will fundamentally change the behavior of every company, branded or generic, that engages in the Hatch–Waxman approval process for generic drugs. Why? First, the statute's reach may extend far beyond settlement agreements and include everyday licenses given to generic-drug filers outside of litigation. Second, the statute grants nearly unfettered authority to FTC to condemn agreements based on any "factor" that FTC, "in its discretion, deems relevant" (3).The statute's scope
The bill would allow FTC to challenge "any agreement resolving or settling .... a patent infringement claim" involving a drug product (4). Such an agreement would be "presumed" unlawful if a generic filer (a) "receives anything of value," and (b) agrees to limit its sale of the generic drug in any way (e.g., splitting the remaining patent life). The term "anything of value" is as broad as it sounds—every rational settlement gives value to the generic-drug filer.
The real breadth of the bill lies in its definition of a "patent infringement claim." No lawsuit is required; the definition includes "any allegation..., whether or not included in a complaint [in] court," that the generic drug "may infringe any patent" (5). Thus, FTC may argue that, when a branded company discusses the possibility of a license with a generic-drug filer, even one who has not challenged the patent, it is "alleging" that the patent would otherwise be infringed (why else would a license be needed?), and the statute thus applies.
I can see FTC making the argument, and a presumption of illegality against any resulting license would follow by definition. The statute purports to allow a safe harbor for settlements that grant a license that is limited, in essence, to a single term: the generic-drug's entry date. Adding any other term such as charging a royalty or making the license exclusive, would trigger the presumption of illegality. I have seen dozens of Hatch–Waxman settlements, and not one would satisfy this bill.
The statute's scope will discourage potential litigants at all stages of the Hach–Waxman process. The statute looms not only over the brand's decision to file a lawsuit, but also over the generic applicant's prior decision to file an application challenging the patent. The generic firm would then know that it may not be permitted to settle on terms that the parties select, and there will be fewer challenges as a result. Indeed, even the brand company's original decision to list the relevant patent in the Orange Book—which FDA law mandates if a generic could infringe the patent—is newly portentous. Under the proposed statute, any of these decisions could trigger a process that ends only in one of two ways: in a fully litigated patent judgment, or a private contract that must be approved by FTC.